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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae (listed in the Appendix) are professors who research, write, and teach about disability
law, special education, civil rights, and administrative
law. They are interested in the proper application of
the statutes that protect disabled students’ rights and
in the scope of exhaustion doctrine. Amici also have an
interest in preserving the ability of parties to voluntarily settle disputes, particularly in the context of the
legislative schemes here, which encourage cooperation
between parties.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By ruling that the standard futility exception to
exhaustion categorically does not apply to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(l), the Sixth Circuit has undermined two intersecting statutory schemes designed to protect the
rights of disabled children in school settings—the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Sixth
Circuit took out of context one statement from Ross v.
Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016)—which construed a
different, mandatory exhaustion provision from the
Prison Litigation Reform Act—and made it the departure point for a fundamental revision of exhaustion
1

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in
part. No person or entity, other than amici, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this
brief. The parties have provided blanket consent to the filing of
amicus briefs.

2
doctrine. In deciding that the time-honored futility exception does not apply to Section 1415(l), the Sixth
Circuit ignored Congress’s language, the provision’s
enactment history, and this Court’s recognition of an
IDEA futility exception in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
327 (1988). And the Sixth Circuit reached this decision
where the plaintiff, prior to bringing his federal ADA
action, had already pursued the administrative process and obtained in settlement all possible relief on
his IDEA claim, and had his ADA claim dismissed by
the administrative hearing officer.
The hearing officer’s refusal to hear the Petitioner’s ADA claim was consistent with common practice around the Nation. Amici have surveyed hearing
officer decisions in jurisdictions in which about ninety
percent of the country’s IDEA due process complaints
are filed. Almost invariably, ADA claims brought before
an IDEA hearing officer are dismissed on the ground
that the officer lacks authority to adjudicate those
claims. IDEA hearing officers also lack authority to
award compensatory damages—a key form of relief
under the ADA and the type of relief that Miguel Perez
(“Miguel”) seeks.
Consistent with administrative law principles, and
in light of amici’s survey, exhaustion of IDEA due process proceedings would be futile and thus not required
before an ADA damages claim may be brought in court.
Administrative exhaustion seeks to enable parties and
the court to benefit from an agency’s “experience and
expertise.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
So, when an administrative decisionmaker “determine[s]

3
that the only issue” for resolution is “beyond his . . . jurisdiction to determine”—as IDEA hearing officers
generally hold regarding ADA claims—“further exhaustion would not merely be futile,” but also “unsupported by any administrative or judicial interest.” Id.
at 765–66. And when there is “doubt as to whether
an agency [i]s empowered to grant effective relief,” exhaustion is not required. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. 140, 147–48 (1992) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973)). No doubt exists here:
The ADA authorizes awards of compensatory damages—the “effective relief ” that Miguel seeks—but
IDEA hearing officers do not award them. There also is
no benefit to holding a hearing to make findings of fact
when the facts are not in dispute. Holding a hearing
when there is nothing left to dispute and no relief to
grant is the very definition of an exercise in futility.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1415(l) undermines an IDEA dispute resolution
system designed to foster collaboration between parents and schools and to encourage resolution of disputes quickly so that students receive needed services.
The decision gives a disabled child an overly circumscribed choice: 1) accept a satisfactory settlement of a
special-education dispute to get services promptly but
give up any non-IDEA claim for compensatory damages, despite significant past harms; or 2) relinquish
the opportunity to quickly obtain vital services, pursue
a costly administrative hearing that can provide no
greater relief than was already offered, but preserve
the non-IDEA damage claim.

4
Finally, amici are concerned about the potential
precedent set by the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to construe
Section 1415(l) as it is written. After this Court’s decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), holding
that any challenge touching on disabled students’ special education had to be channeled through the IDEA,
Congress swiftly rejected that holding by enacting
Section 1415(l) to provide that “nothing in [the IDEA]
shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies” available under the ADA and
other civil rights laws. Congress appended a provision
requiring exhaustion only when an action seeks relief
“also available” under the IDEA. Under the clear statutory language, Miguel was entitled to bring his ADA
claim both because he completed the mandated IDEA
administrative process and because he was seeking relief not available under the IDEA. The Sixth Circuit
acted as though Smith was still the law of the land and
Section 1415(l) had not been enacted. Its decision
should be reversed.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

A FUTILITY EXCEPTION IS WARRANTED
HERE BECAUSE ENGAGING IN FURTHER
IDEA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
WOULD BE A POINTLESS EXERCISE.

Amici agree with Petitioner that Section 1415(l)
incorporates the standard futility exception to exhaustion and that the decision below is at odds with this
Court’s recognition of a futility exception in Honig, 484

5
U.S. at 327. See Pet’r’s Br. 42–48. Contrary to the Sixth
Circuit’s sweeping conclusion in Perez v. Sturgis Public
Schools, 3 F.4th 236, 242–43 (6th Cir. 2021) (Pet.App.
10a), this Court has recognized futility as an exception
to exhaustion in multiple statutory contexts. See Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988)
(finding that statutory review process does not require
futile presentation of question beyond reviewer’s authority); Montana Nat’l Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone
Cnty., 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928) (recognizing futility of
application to agency that was “powerless to grant any
appropriate relief”); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 247 U.S. 282, 287 (1918) (rejecting requirement that railroad exhaust state statutory
scheme for contesting tax assessment because there
was doubt as to whether administrative process could
provide relief ).
Exhaustion “serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145. Thus,
when an agency lacks institutional competence to adjudicate an issue or lacks authority to grant relief requested, courts apply well-established administrativelaw exceptions to avoid requiring exhaustion as an
empty exercise. See id. at 147–48; Weinberger, 422 U.S.
at 765. Similarly, when there is “nothing to be gained
from permitting the compilation of a detailed factual
record, or from agency expertise,” exhaustion would be
futile. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 484.
As amici demonstrate below, ADA claims for damages are not redressable in the IDEA hearing process.

6
Further, as happened here, when claimants attempt to
bring ADA claims in the IDEA administrative process,
hearing officers dismiss those claims as outside their
jurisdiction. Thus, hearing officers do not develop expertise in ADA damage claims. Nor does exhaustion
produce a record that is useful for adjudication of the
ADA damages claim, which hinges on proving discriminatory intent and is, in any event, considered de novo
by the district court.2
A. The IDEA Hearing Process is Not Designed to Adjudicate ADA Claims or
Award Compensatory Damages.
The IDEA hearing process is structured so that
students with disabilities will use its administrative
procedures to vindicate their rights to special-education services, not their rights to equal access protected
by the ADA. The IDEA requires state agencies to establish “due process proceedings” that permit parents
to challenge a school district’s action related to “the
2

See, e.g., Hupp v. Switzerland of Ohio Local Sch. Dist., 912
F. Supp. 2d 572, 586–87 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (applying “traditional
[summary judgment/de novo] standard of review” to Plaintiff ’s
ADA claims and “modified de novo standard of review” to IDEA
claims); but see, Stephen O. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 20-1991,
2021 WL 6136217, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2021) (applying
modified de novo standard giving due weight to Hearing Officer’s
factual findings to plaintiffs’ overlapping Section 504 and ADA
claims seeking only compensatory education and services and tuition reimbursement). See generally Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157
F. Supp. 2d 729, 732 (E.D. Mich. June 6, 2001) (concluding ADA
Plaintiff entitled to trial by jury with respect to liability and compensatory damages).

7
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education.” See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f ), (g), (l).
State laws establishing those procedures reference
the IDEA and do not refer to or confer jurisdiction over
ADA claims. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1),
(b), (d)(1); Ill. Admin. Code tit. 23, §§ 226.610, 226.615,
226.630(a), 226.670, 226.690; Mich. Admin. Code R.
340.1724f(3)(k). See infra I.B.
Every step of the multi-tiered process is geared toward the resolution of IDEA, not ADA, claims. To request a hearing, a complainant must submit a dueprocess complaint describing only “matter[s] relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education. . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). Model
forms developed by states to assist parents in filing
complaints expressly invoke the IDEA’s requirements
and do not mention the ADA.3 For example, Michigan’s
form advises complainants that it may be used to request a due process hearing “to resolve a disagreement
about the identification, evaluation, eligibility, educational placement, or manifestation determination of a
student, or regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education for a student under the [IDEA].”4
3

Amici reviewed the 2021 IDEA-mandated model state complaint forms, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(8), for each U.S. jurisdiction,
and none refers to the ADA, indicating that IDEA hearing officers
are not expected to adjudicate ADA claims. The model forms for
the twelve jurisdictions surveyed in this brief are collected here:
https://perma.cc/8QZX-Y8QK.
4
See id.

8
When claims reach the hearing stage, complainants
are limited to raising issues identified in their initial
filings, absent consent of the opposing party. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f )(3)(B).
A hearing officer’s decision at a due process hearing must be based “on a determination of whether the
child received a free appropriate public education.” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f )(3)(E)(i). Thus, the substantive expertise required of hearing officers is “knowledge of, and
the ability to understand, the provisions of [the IDEA],
Federal and State regulations pertaining to [the IDEA],
and legal interpretations of [the IDEA] by Federal and
State courts,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)—not the
ADA’s anti-discrimination provisions.
The relief available through the IDEA hearing
process is limited to equitable relief for denial of a free
appropriate public education (FAPE), typically compensatory special education services such as Miguel’s
placement at a private school and reimbursement of
parents’ past out-of-pocket educational expenditures.
See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t
of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369–71 (1985). These
awards are distinct from compensatory damages, id. at
370–72, which are not available for violations of the
IDEA.5
5

See, e.g., McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d
640, 647 (5th Cir. 2019); Moore v. Kan. City Pub. Schs., 828 F.3d
687, 693 (8th Cir. 2016); C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 679 F.3d
1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012); Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 185–86 (3d Cir. 2009);
Ortega v. Bibb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.
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B. IDEA Hearing Decisions Confirm that
Hearing Officers Do Not Exercise Jurisdiction Over ADA Claims or Award
Compensatory Damages.
Hearing officers, following the IDEA’s mandates,
typically hear only IDEA claims and almost never hear
ADA claims. Amici have surveyed the IDEA administrative process in eleven states and the District of Columbia, where about ninety percent of the country’s
IDEA due-process complaints arise.6 Time and again,
IDEA hearing officers dismiss ADA claims on the
ground that they lack authority to hear them, and
hearing officers never award compensatory damages,
illustrating the futility of bringing an ADA claim
through the IDEA’s administrative process.7

2005); see also Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 n.4
(2017).
6
The jurisdictions were selected based on a study observing
that ninety percent of IDEA complaints arose in ten states, D.C.,
and Puerto Rico. See Consortium for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., IDEA Data Brief at 2 (May 2017), https://
www.cadreworks.org/sites/default/files/resources/CADRE%20DPC
%20Brief_WebFinal_6.2017.pdf. Puerto Rico was omitted from
amici’s survey because its policies and hearing-officer decisions
are published in Spanish only. Amici’s survey also includes Michigan, where Miguel brought his due-process complaint.
7
Amici surveyed every hearing-officer decision in California,
Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey through December 2021.
These states had either a limited number of published decisions
or online search mechanisms enabling amici to filter decisions using search terms. The eight other jurisdictions published dozens—in some cases, hundreds—of decisions each year but did not
have similar search mechanisms. For those jurisdictions, amici
reviewed all hearing-officer decisions dating back at least five
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California. California’s special-education law directs state agencies to establish “[a]ll procedural safeguards under the [IDEA]” and invokes only federal
IDEA regulations. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56500.1(a), 56500.3,
56500.6; see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3080(a), 3082(a).
Amici surveyed all California due-process decisions
and found that hearing officers dismiss ADA claims
as “outside the jurisdiction” of California’s IDEA administrative body. Nos. 2012020458, 2012020005, and
2012090247 at 3 n.2 (Jan. 14, 2013)8; see also, e.g., No.
2018050651 at 32 n.6 (Sept. 21, 2018)9; No. 2010110301
at 3 n.1 (Feb. 7, 2011)10; Nos. 2010090344 and
2010070140 at 2 n.1 (Feb. 3, 2010)11; No. 2019101130
at 6 (Sept. 25, 2020) (dismissing ADA claim for lack of
jurisdiction and noting that IDEA hearing officers do
not award compensatory damages).12
Connecticut. Connecticut’s special-education
law references the IDEA and its right to an impartial
hearing-officer decision. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1076h(a)(1), (b), (d)(1); accord Conn. Agencies Regs. §§ 1076h-2, 10-76h-3(a), 10-76h-7(a). Not surprisingly, Connecticut’s IDEA due-process decisions generally do not
mention the ADA. Dating to 2011, only two decisions
involved an ADA claim, with both dismissed for “lack
years through December 2021. Amici have provided a footnoted
link to each decision cited.
8
https://perma.cc/3M2H-25K2
9
https://perma.cc/3XGK-PNLG
10
https://perma.cc/8SMQ-FZVY
11
https://perma.cc/722U-TNA9
12
https://perma.cc/GFC5-TSRS
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of subject-matter jurisdiction.” No. 21-0123 at 2 (Dec.
22, 2020)13; Nos. 16-0486 and 16-0617 at 17 (June 7,
2017) (stating that Connecticut law limits jurisdiction
to “confirming, modifying or rejecting the identification, evaluation or educational placement of or the
provision of FAPE to a child, to determining the appropriateness of a unilateral placement of a child or to
prescribing alternative special education programs for
a child.”).14
District of Columbia. D.C.’s special-education
law focuses exclusively on the IDEA, see D.C. Code
§§ 38-2571.03(1), (2), (6)(A), 38-2571.04, 38-2572.02(a),
with no mention of the ADA. Amici reviewed all hearing decisions dating to 2016, and only three involved
ADA claims. One observed that “in the District of Columbia, a [hearing officer’s] jurisdiction is limited to
disputes about the eligibility, identification, evaluation, educational placement, or the provision of FAPE.”
No. 2019-0301 at 32 (June 30, 2020) (concluding that
“[i]t is abundantly clear,” that the hearing officer’s limited jurisdiction did not extend to ADA claims).15 The
others were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, No. 20190073 at 3 (June 17, 2019),16 and “without prejudice.”
No. 2016-0023 at 3 n.4 (Apr. 2, 2016).17

13
14
15
16
17

https://perma.cc/DA5W-57AK
https://perma.cc/V49T-YS9M
https://perma.cc/2EG3-6FE5
https://perma.cc/3Y5N-HD29
https://perma.cc/ZP4K-T7SV
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Florida. Florida’s special-education law requires
the state to “comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as amended, and its implementing regulations.” Fla. Stat. § 1003.571(1). Hearing
officers may consider non-IDEA claims, but only when
the school district contracts with the state adjudicatory agency to do so. Id. § 120.65(6). See No. 12-3976E
at 11 n.4 (Apr. 5, 2013) (hearing Rehabilitation Act
claim because of contractual authorization to hear cases
involving school-based “section 504 plans” providing
services to access the child’s educational program).18
Amici’s review of all Florida due-process decisions
since 2007 reveals no decision in which a school district
contracted for adjudication of ADA claims. Thus, hearing officers dismiss ADA claims for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., No. 18-0604E at 2 n.1 (Aug. 16, 2018)19;
No. 12-2322E at 5 (Oct. 22, 2012)20; Nos. 09-0568E and
09-1233E at 85 (Sept. 9, 2009).21
Illinois. Illinois’ special-education regulations refer to the IDEA, but not to other statutes protecting
students with disabilities. See Ill. Admin. Code tit.
23, §§ 226.610, 226.615, 226.630(a), 226.670, 226.690.
Amici’s survey of every Illinois IDEA due-process decision since 2014 reveals only two involving ADA claims,
and both disclaimed jurisdiction. In one, the hearing
officer held “she d[id] not have jurisdiction over the
18
19
20
21

https://perma.cc/WAF2-C3EU
https://perma.cc/H2BW-YXYQ
https://perma.cc/S8GD-BS7X
https://perma.cc/GYZ7-SNCP
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ADA claims, but d[id] have jurisdiction to address
whether Student was denied a FAPE under the IDEA.”
No. 2018-0062 at ISBE000168 (Feb. 1, 2018).22 In the
other, the hearing officer had “no jurisdiction to adjudicate” ADA claims because “[i]n Illinois, an [IDEA
hearing officer’s] jurisdiction is limited to . . . matters
involving the identification, evaluation, educational
placement or the provisions of a free appropriate public education.” No. 2018-0391 at 17 & n.31 (Nov. 13,
2018).23
Maryland. Maryland’s special-education disputeresolution processes are designed to handle only IDEA
claims. Hearing officers must be “knowledgeable and
understand[ ] the provisions of the IDEA, and federal
and State regulations pertaining to the IDEA, and legal interpretations of the IDEA.”24 Like the IDEA,
Maryland law specifies that a hearing officer’s decision
“shall be made on substantive grounds based on the
determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 8413(g)(1).
Amici reviewed every special-education decision
published by the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings. One held that the complainant had “no legal
authority” to file an administrative complaint alleging
22

https://perma.cc/NLL9-J6L9
https://perma.cc/D7UT-GEBJ
24
Maryland State Department of Education, Parental Rights:
Maryland Procedural Safeguards Notice at 33–34, https://www.pgcps.
org/globalassets/offices/special-education/docs-special-education/
maryland-procedural-safeguards-notice.pdf.
23
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discriminatory retaliation under the ADA. No. MSDECITY-OT-17-37284 at 8–9, 12 n.6 (Mar. 16, 2018).25 In
another, a parent included an ADA claim in the original due-process complaint, but the hearing officer later
noted the claim had been dropped. No. MSDE-BCNYOT-18-18944 at 2 n.3 (Aug. 28, 2018).26 Amici found no
case in which a Maryland hearing officer considered an
ADA claim on its merits.
Massachusetts. Massachusetts law authorizes
IDEA hearing officers to adjudicate IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act claims, but not ADA claims. Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2A(a), (c). And even when hearing
Rehabilitation Act claims, hearing officers “lack[ ] authority to award monetary damages.” No. 06-6508 at 3
(Mar. 9, 2007).27 Amici reviewed every decision dating
to 2016, and students attempting to bring ADA claims
are sent away empty-handed because Massachusetts
hearing officers “do[ ] not have jurisdiction over the
ADA.” No. 1702629 at 1 n.2 (Nov. 9, 2016) (citing Nos.
1404388 and 1309716, which held that IDEA hearing
officers lack jurisdiction over ADA claims).28
Michigan. In Michigan, due-process hearings are
conducted “in accordance with the [IDEA].” Mich. Admin.
Code R. 340.1724f(3)(k). Amici reviewed every published IDEA hearing decision since 1997. Hearing officers dismiss non-IDEA claims, including ADA claims,
25
26
27
28

https://perma.cc/D4WZ-XVL5
https://perma.cc/JD7F-A9L4
https://perma.cc/GZL5-US9Q
https://perma.cc/P98J-ULLY
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because they are “not within the purview of this forum.” See, e.g., No. 2008-018 at 46 (Apr. 6, 2009)29; No.
2003-007b at 11 (Oct. 8, 2003)30; accord No. 13-001454
at 21 (Oct. 2013).31 One decision held that “monetary
damages under § 504 or the ADA is beyond [a hearing
officer’s] authority to award.” No. 2004-105E at 5–6
(Oct. 17, 2006).32
New Jersey. New Jersey law authorizes hearing
officers to decide IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.7(k), (w). No statute authorizes hearing officers to decide ADA claims, and no
hearing officer has reached the merits of an ADA claim.
In one case, the hearing officer did not address the
ADA claim, but noted that “this tribunal does not have
the authority to award damages,” and then held that
the parents could “pursue their [non-IDEA] claims in
federal court.” No. EDS 07848-17 at 2, 79–80 (July 18,
2019).33 In another, the hearing officer mentioned the
student’s ADA claim, but disposed of the case solely because “the District has met all of its obligations under
the IDEA and New Jersey statutes and regulations,”
making no further mention of the ADA. No. EDS
08837-19 at 2, 59–60 (Mar. 9, 2020).34

29
30
31
32
33
34

https://perma.cc/VPK5-3VL2
https://perma.cc/D3PJ-WR7J
https://perma.cc/SC8L-5T8B
https://perma.cc/D6N5-G6DQ
https://perma.cc/KW7F-QTU5
https://perma.cc/8EAV-2UJX
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New York. New York’s special-education regulations mimic federal law, requiring that “a decision
made by an impartial hearing officer shall be made
on substantive grounds based on a determination of
whether the student received a free appropriate public education.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8,
§ 200.5(j)(4)(i). Hearing officers have come to inconsistent conclusions regarding their power to hear ADA
claims. One held that he “[wa]s not the trier of fact for
. . . the ADA,” so he could “offer no relief pursuant to
[the ADA].” No. 162323 at 72 (Aug. 4, 2018).35 Other
decisions are in accord. No. 503548 at 10 (Aug. 15,
2017)36; No. IH-2016(65) at 21 (Apr. 6, 2016).37 But another decision found that the school “denied [the student] a FAPE . . . in violation of the IDEA, Section 504
and the ADA.” No. 172586 at 12–13 (July 27, 2018).38
Even there, the complainant was awarded only prospective educational services, as available under the
IDEA, not compensatory damages. Id. Based on amici’s
review, no New York hearing officer has ever awarded
compensatory damages under the ADA (or any other
statute).
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania authorizes hearing officers to decide both IDEA and Rehabilitation
Act claims. 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.162, 15.8(a). The Commonwealth’s due-process complaint form thus allows
35
36
37
38

https://perma.cc/7UV5-E6T7
https://perma.cc/UG3H-NSVX
https://perma.cc/3ZGV-XJ22
https://perma.cc/A63Y-MUYF
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complainants to indicate whether they are seeking
relief under either or both statutes.39 Notably, a Rehabilitation Act complainant challenging the school
district’s failure to provide “aids, services and accommodations specified in the student’s service agreement” “may” use the due-process system, 22 Pa. Code
§ 15.8(a), and go to court afterwards, but “is not required to start with the due process system.”40
Pennsylvania statutes and regulations do not
mention the ADA, which has created “considerable disagreement as to whether [hearing officers] have jurisdiction to hear ADA claims.” No. 20014-1718AS at 11
n.5 (Feb. 16, 2018) (not reaching the complainant’s
ADA claim because the school had not denied the student a FAPE).41 Just last year, a hearing officer held
that a school had not discriminated under the ADA,
No. 23695-19-20 at 34 (Mar. 2, 2021),42 while another
dismissed an ADA claim for lack of jurisdiction, No.
24533-20-21 at 2 n.3 (May 27, 2021).43 In any event,
no Pennsylvania hearing officer has ever awarded

39

Pennsylvania Office of Dispute Resolution, Due Process
Complaint, https://perma.cc/U6B7-AZZE.
40
Pennsylvania Office of Dispute Resolution, Understanding
Special Education Due Process Hearings: A Guide for Parents 32
(2019), https://perma.cc/8RHB-RERD.
41
https://perma.cc/7W7E-A4JG
42
https://perma.cc/T25H-NNTB (refusing to find a violation
of Section 504 or the ADA based on the school’s termination of the
child’s 504 educational services plan).
43
https://perma.cc/62RF-3G54
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compensatory damages under the ADA or even suggested there was authority to do so.
Texas. Texas’s due-process complaint form requires “a statement that a public education agency has
violated Part B of the IDEA” or a “state special education statute or administrative rule.” 19 Tex. Admin.
Code § 89.1195(b)(3). Not surprisingly, Texas hearing
officers invariably dismiss ADA claims (as well as
other non-IDEA claims) for “lack of jurisdiction.” See,
e.g., No. 017-SE-0920 at 2 n.2 (June 23, 2021)44; No.
365-SE-0719 at 1–2 (Nov. 15, 2019)45; No. 144-SE-0119
at 3 (June 21, 2019)46; No. 228-SE-0518 at 36 (Feb. 8,
2019).47
C. Requiring a Hearing on IDEA Claims
that Have Already Been Resolved Would
Not Improve the Accuracy or Efficiency
of Judicial Proceedings.
IDEA exhaustion permits agencies to exercise discretion and apply educational expertise, facilitate “exploration of technical educational issues,” develop a
factual record, and “promote[ ] judicial efficiency by
giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct
shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967
F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992). In circumstances like
44
45
46
47

https://perma.cc/Q6TS-8S9Z
https://perma.cc/X53N-ZE36
https://perma.cc/7RVJ-LKR8
https://perma.cc/DE2Z-HU5E
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Miguel’s, none of these purposes would have been
served by further IDEA proceedings.
Further IDEA proceedings would not serve the
purpose of improved efficiency when the parties no
longer dispute any relevant factual issues or appropriate relief under the IDEA. The due-process complaint
and hearing focus on the facts of the complainant’s alleged FAPE denial and a proposed solution. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.508(b). The settlement here reflected agreement
on the key IDEA facts—that Miguel was deaf, had not
received a FAPE, and, as a result, required compensatory education and related services. A hearing would
have entailed the submission of evidence that was
likely already in the administrative record, the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, followed by
the hearing officer’s findings of fact and decision—at
great expense to the parties, school staff, and the forum
to establish facts not in dispute. Nor can it be considered efficient to require a hearing when the only claim
unresolved is one that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
hearing officer. See Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 767 (recognizing that exhaustion is futile when agency lacked
authority to resolve constitutional claim and that it
“would also be a commitment of administrative resources unsupported by any administrative or judicial
interest”).
Nor would an administrative hearing concerning
Miguel’s IDEA claim “have improved the accuracy and
efficiency” of the subsequent federal proceedings to
address his ADA claim, as the Sixth Circuit speculated
in dicta. Pet.App. 13a. The benefit of any additional
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peripheral factfinding on the IDEA claim would be
marginal at best when the ADA damage claim differs
from the IDEA claim and the hearing officer lacks relevant substantive expertise. As demonstrated above,
IDEA hearing officers are experts in special education,
not in ADA claims for damages that they invariably do
not hear. IDEA claims and ADA claims seeking monetary damages for past discrimination differ in critical
ways. The central questions in an IDEA claim are
whether the school followed IDEA procedures and
whether the child received a FAPE. Board of Educ. of
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 206–07 (1982); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f )(3)(E).
On the other hand, the central questions in an ADA
damages claim are: 1) whether a school provided the
disabled student with equal and non-discriminatory
access to and participation in its programs, see 42
U.S.C. § 12132; and 2) whether the discrimination was
intentional. See, e.g., Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of
the La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir.
2018).
A finding that a child was provided a FAPE does
not determine whether equal access or effective communication was provided under the ADA. See K.M. ex
rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088,
1099 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that ADA effective communication claim was not foreclosed by finding that
plaintiffs with hearing disabilities had been provided
a FAPE). Alternatively, if a hearing officer determines
that a child was denied a FAPE, that does not establish
the discriminatory intent required for an ADA damage
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claim, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate bad
faith, deliberate indifference, or gross misjudgment.48
Federal courts, not IDEA hearing officers, have unique
expertise in assessing ADA claims, as they routinely
consider whether plaintiffs have proffered sufficient
evidence on intent to create triable issues of fact in discrimination claims. See, e.g., C.L. v. Scarsdale Union
Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 841 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary judgment against parents on
Section 504 claim, even though IDEA violation proven,
because of insufficient intent evidence).
Nor would a hearing serve the other goal of agency
deference—to permit the agency to correct its own mistakes before being haled into court. See McCarthy, 503
U.S. at 145. The school system already agreed to remedy its past failures to provide special education by
providing compensatory education and related signlanguage instruction. At that point, the agency’s interest in correcting its mistakes was served—a hearing
would not have permitted the school to correct past intentional discrimination for which compensatory damages are the remedy. See, e.g., Witte v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 197 F. 3d. 1271, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 1999),
overruled in part on other grounds by Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 870–71 (9th Cir. 2011);
48

See, e.g., S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring deliberate indifference); D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629
F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2010) (requiring bad faith or gross departure from accepted educational standards); see also Nieves–
Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126–27 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting discriminatory animus required).
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Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F. Supp. 2d 729, 732 (E.D.
Mich. 2001).
II.

REQUIRING FURTHER EXHAUSTION
AFTER VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT UNDERMINES THE IDEA’S GOAL OF ENCOURAGING PROMPT RESOLUTION OF
EDUCATIONAL DISPUTES.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that having settled
his IDEA claims, Miguel had not exhausted the IDEA
administrative process and could not pursue his ADA
claim in court. Pet.App. 9a. The decision places the student in an impossible position: 1) accept an IDEA settlement that will immediately provide essential
special-education services but relinquish all non-IDEA
claims; or 2) place oneself at educational risk by rejecting necessary services and pursue an IDEA due process hearing to establish a right to services the district
was willing to provide, simply to preserve the right to
pursue non-IDEA claims in the only forum that will
actually decide them: court. Left standing, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision will do little more than deter appropriate IDEA settlements that would benefit disabled
children for no legitimate purpose—undermining the
IDEA’s goals of providing prompt services and fostering the early, voluntary resolution of educational disputes.
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A. The IDEA is Structured to Resolve Disputes Quickly to Provide Timely Special-Education Services.
Section 1415(l) must be understood in light of “the
entire statutory scheme,” see Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 523 (2007), which focuses on
identification, evaluation, and prompt provision of educational services to qualifying students. Disabled
children’s rights to IDEA services are principally secured through a collaborative process among parents,
educators, and other experts to develop an individualized education program and provide the child with a
FAPE that meets their unique developmental and educational needs. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 994 (2017).
This process should function “with the speed necessary
to avoid detriment to the child’s education.” See Forest
Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 245 (2009) (citation omitted). See generally, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(2)
(providing early intervention services); 1412(a)(2) (requiring state timetable for meeting disabled student
needs); 1414(a)(1)(C) (setting time frame for evaluations); 1415(c)(2)(B)(i) (setting deadline for school
district response to parent complaint); 1415(f )(1)(B)
(requiring preliminary resolution meeting within 15
days of parent complaint).
Recognizing that disputes will arise between parents and school districts, the IDEA creates opportunities to resolve disputes at numerous points in the
administrative process. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)
(mediation); 1415(f )(1)(B) (resolution session); Alegria
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v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262, 267–68 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (noting that procedures in § 1415 encourage settlement). To further encourage early dispute resolution, the IDEA permits school districts to make binding
ten-day offers of settlement prior to a hearing that
limit the parents’ attorney’s fees and costs if they reject the proposed settlement and ultimately obtain
less favorable relief in formal adjudication. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). Consistent with this preference for
voluntary resolution, most parents resolve their disputes without adversarial hearings. For example, nearly
eighty percent of those due process complaints filed
and resolved nationwide in 2018–19 were resolved
without a due-process hearing.49 These opportunities
for voluntary dispute resolution prior to administrative adjudication help “ensure prompt resolution of
disputes regarding appropriate education for handicapped children. . . .” Spiegler v. District of Columbia,
866 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing 121 Cong. Rec.
37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams, principal
IDEA author, noting that prompt provision of services
prevents “substantial setback to the child’s development”)).
The IDEA’s emphasis on prompt provision of services comports with research demonstrating that
timely intervention is the best path toward independence and mitigation of the disabling effects of a child’s
49

Center for Appropriate Disp. Resol. in Special Educ., IDEA
Dispute Resolution Data Summary for: U.S. and Outlying Areas
2008–09 to 2018–19, 11–12 (2020), https://www.cadreworks.org/
resources/cadre-materials/2019-20-dr-data-summary-national.
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condition.50 For students who must regularly practice
educational and functional skills, every instructional
minute is important, such that missing even a few
weeks of school can undo months or even years of progress. See Susan R. Easterbrooks et al., Ignoring Free,
Appropriate, Public Education, a Costly Mistake: The
Case of F.M. & L.G. versus Barbour County, 9 J. Deaf
Stud. & Deaf Educ. 219, 225 (2004) (discussing importance of providing appropriate language services to
Deaf students to avoid permanent developmental delays and reduced employability and earning potential);
Wyatte C. Hall, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You:
The Risk of Language Deprivation by Impairing Sign
Language Development in Deaf Children, 21 Maternal
& Child Health J. 961, 962 (2017). IDEA exhaustion
must be understood within the context of this IDEA
statutory scheme that encourages pre-hearing dispute
resolution to ensure the quickest delivery of specialeducation services to disabled children.
B. Requiring Further IDEA Administrative Proceedings Would Deter Voluntary IDEA Settlements that Serve the
Interests of the Parties and the Process.
By forcing families who wish to preserve intentional
discrimination damage claims to reject appropriate
50

See, e.g., National Ctr. on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Why
Act Early if You’re Concerned about Development? (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/actearly/whyActEarly.html.
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IDEA settlements and pursue (no longer disputed)
FAPE issues through administrative hearings that
cannot provide additional relief, the Sixth Circuit’s decision would inevitably discourage future IDEA settlements—harming both students and school districts.
See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985). Not only
would the decision force parties to waste time and resources, it would diminish the efficient operation of the
IDEA administrative hearing process by requiring
hearings for matters that were already resolved with a
focus on claims (such as those under the ADA) on
which hearing officers lack expertise, experience,
and adjudicatory authority. See generally McDermott,
Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 215 (1994); see also,
e.g., F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 154 (2013)
(discussing policy favoring settlements to avoid the
unnecessary expenditure of time, money and judicial
resources).
The IDEA’s encouragement of settlement is consistent with the broader view that settlement is “the
modal civil case outcome.” Theodore Eisenberg &
Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 111,
112 (2009). Voluntary settlements are encouraged in
state and federal courts and in federal procedural and
evidentiary rules. See, e.g., Reiter v. MTA N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 seeks “to encourage[s] settlements without the burdens of additional litigation”);
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350 (1981);
see also, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (providing pre-trial
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conferences to “[facilitate] settlement”); 2006 Advisory
Committee’s Note, Fed. R. Evid. 408 (noting rule promotes “public policy” favoring settlements). This general policy preference for voluntary settlement when
appropriate is a central governing principle in our judicial and administrative forums.
Sometimes settlement does not fully resolve the
parties’ dispute, but can narrow the issues, leaving litigation only for those issues where there is an impasse.
It is not uncommon for parties to settle some issues
or claims and save others for later resolution by settlement or trial. See, e.g., 1 California Deskbook on
Complex Civil Litigation Management § 4.34 (2021).
Parties also frequently settle injunctive claims to obtain immediate relief while saving damages claims for
subsequent resolution. See Carson v. American Brands,
Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 89–90 (1981) (endorsing this practice); see also Delta Air Lines, Inc., 450 U.S. at 350 (observing that defendant can offer to settle damage
claims after a verdict or order finding it legally liable);
8 Moore’s Federal Practice—Civil § 42.20 (2021) (noting traditional divisibility of liability and damages determinations); Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(c) (permitting formal
offers to settle damages after defendant’s liability has
been established).
Like the significant number of individuals who resolve educational disputes without adversarial hearings,51 the school district proffered a 10-day settlement
51

See U. S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-20-22, Special
Education: IDEA Dispute Resolution Activity in Selected States
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offer agreeing to immediately provide Miguel with appropriate continuing and compensatory education and
related services, Pet.App. 2a, in exchange for releasing the district from all IDEA liability. Miguel’s antidiscrimination claims were preserved for future resolution. The settlement in Miguel’s case was not atypical.52 He had a strong case for immediate equitable
relief in the form of an appropriate instructional program and related services to prepare him for an independent life. Like other litigants, school districts
benefit from settling rather than holding an expensive
and time-consuming hearing that serves no purpose,
especially in a case such as Miguel’s where there is no
factual dispute over the disabled child’s needs or the
appropriate way to meet them.
Here, the school district’s attorneys, who were
fully familiar with IDEA requirements and the hearing officer’s dismissal of Miguel’s ADA claim, freely offered to settle the IDEA claims in exchange for release
of Miguel’s IDEA claims, but not those under the
Varied Based on School Districts’ Characteristics 9–11 (2019)
(hereinafter, GAO Report) (noting increase in mediation requests,
decline in due process complaints, and sharp decline in full adjudications at hearings).
52
See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist.,
816 F.3d 1216, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing settlement
providing tutoring and compensatory counseling services and reimbursing costs of private evaluation); D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing
settlement in which the school district would pay for costs of placing student at private school for two years and student released
the district for all claims for “further costs based upon this placement, related service, or transportation in connection therewith”).
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ADA.53 The proposed settlement terms were clear and
permitted Miguel to “make [a] reasonable decision[ ]
regarding the conduct of litigation.” Boorstein v. City of
New York, 107 F.R.D. 31, *34 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Alabama in Birmingham,
706 F.2d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
offeree can only accept the offer provided by the offeror), holding modified by Gaines v. Dougherty Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 775 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985). Miguel accepted the terms of the settlement he was offered.
Here, in an open-eyed, bilateral settlement agreement between the parties and their experienced lawyers, Miguel relinquished his IDEA claims in exchange
for the district’s immediate provision of IDEA services.
Students are entitled to have voluntary IDEA settlements recognized and enforced based on the terms of
their final, accepted written agreement.54 See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1415(f )(1)(B)(iii) (providing that IDEA settlement
agreements will be “legally binding” and “enforceable”);
53

The school district could have made an offer on the ADA
claim, or demanded a release of that claim, but did not. For an
example of an IDEA release that also releases the district for liability on the student’s ADA claims, see R.K., ex rel. T.K. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 06-07836 JSW, 2007 WL 2778702,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007).
54
The parties should be able to freely reach agreement as
long as the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is treated as a nonjurisdictional claims processing rule. Circuits are divided on this
point. See, e.g., Payne, 653 F.3d at 867–71, overruled by Albino v.
Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014); Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub.
Sch., 715 F.3d 775, 783–84 (10th Cir. 2013) (questioning prior
Tenth Circuit cases finding exhaustion jurisdictional and discussing split in Circuit decisions).
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see generally, e.g., Cooper v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors
Bureau, Inc., 42 F.4th 675, 684 (7th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that parties will be held to terms of the final,
accepted written agreement); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release
§ 2 (2021) (recognizing that “definite, certain, and unambiguous” settlement agreements should be enforced).
Once the parties have entered into a voluntary settlement of their FAPE claims, those agreements should
be enforced. See, e.g., D.R. by M.R., 109 F.3d at 901
(“[P]ublic policy plainly favors upholding the settlement agreement entered between D.R.’s parents and
the Board.”). The decision below undercuts the settlement agreement reached within the administrative
process. If not reversed, the decision will undermine
the ability of parties to settle disputes when it is in
their interests to do so, undermining a principal objective of the IDEA and, more generally, the clear legal
and policy preference of Congress and the courts.
III. SECTION 1415(l)’S PLAIN LANGUAGE
PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED
STUDENTS TO ASSERT NON-IDEA CLAIMS
ARISING IN A SCHOOL SETTING.
The panel’s decision is contrary to Section 1415(l)’s
clear text. After Smith held that all challenges related
to the adequacy of disabled students’ special education
had to be channeled through the IDEA, Congress
swiftly rejected it by enacting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) to
protect disabled students’ rights to bring school-based
non-IDEA discrimination claims. See Pub. L. No. 99372, § 3, 100 Stat. 796, 797; H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 4
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(1985) (affirming “viability of . . . other statutes as
separate vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped children”). Section 1415(l)’s language is clear:
“[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, or remedies available
under . . . other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities . . . ” Section 1415(l) protects
a student’s right to assert their non-IDEA claims.
However, if those claims are seeking “relief that is also
available” under the IDEA, they have to exhaust the
IDEA administrative procedures in §§ 1415(f ) and (g)
prior to bringing those non-IDEA claims, but only “to
the same extent as would be required” for an IDEA
claim. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The panel’s decision demands much more from the student.
The Sixth Circuit takes us back to the days of
Smith and ignores the statute’s language and enactment history. Reading 1415(l) according to its plain
language as courts must, see, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 534 (2004), Miguel met all his 1415(l) obligations prior to bringing his ADA action. First, he attempted to bring his ADA claim in the IDEA forum,
only to have that claim dismissed at the behest of the
school district. Then, he fully resolved his FAPE/IDEA
claim in a settlement with the district, satisfying his
obligations under §§ 1415(f ) and (g). See generally
Muskrat, 715 F.3d at 778. He then pursued his ADA
claim for the additional relief that was not available
under the IDEA. This is precisely the result that the
statute’s terms authorize. There was no effort to
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prematurely interrupt the administrative process. See
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).55
This Court has recognized that relief for an ADA
damages claim is not “available” when the student
would be sent away from the IDEA forum “emptyhanded.” Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 753–54 (citation omitted). As
explained in Point IB, supra, the IDEA hearing officer
won’t decide an ADA claim, nor will they award monetary damages. See id. at 752 n.4. The student seeking
compensatory damages for an ADA violation simply
cannot get that relief through the IDEA process, and
Section 1415(l) does not require them to further exhaust that process. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 7
(statement of bill sponsor clarifying that exhaustion is
not required when it would “be futile” or “improbable
that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies” such as when “the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought”).
See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 32, Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 753–54; D.D. by & through Ingram v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 105862 (9th Cir. 2021) (Bumatay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see McMillen, 939 F.3d at 643,
645–48 (dismissing on exhaustion grounds damage
55

Some courts have raised concerns that a fair, plain-language reading of 1415(l) will encourage students to circumvent
the IDEA process and go straight to court. Even if one indulges
the atextual notion that factors outside the statute’s words merit
consideration, see, e.g., McMillen, 939 F.3d at 648; Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 2002); Polera v. Board of Ed., 288 F.3d 478, 487–88, 490 (2d Cir. 2002),
these concerns do not apply in the procedural posture here.
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claim found to be perfectly coextensive with FAPE
claim and collecting cases).
Clarification of this point would not result in a
rush to file damage claims against school districts.
First, evidence indicates that parents already have difficulties accessing even the more user-friendly IDEA
administrative procedures, see GAO Report at 20, 28,56
and parents are at least as likely to be deterred by the
even greater barriers to commencing a federal court
action. The additional evidentiary standards for establishing intentional discrimination and entitlement to
compensatory damages, such as medical expenses or
lost earning capacity, see supra note 48, at 16, create
further barriers deterring inappropriate filings. Consequently, there is little incentive to file ADA damage
claims except in the most egregious cases. A decision
supporting Petitioners will not result in a flood of ADA
litigation in lieu of IDEA proceedings. Students will
continue to use the less costly and more accessible
IDEA process to obtain their educational services. The
Sixth Circuit’s decision, however, forecloses the student’s right to bring precisely the non-IDEA action
that Section 1415(l) was enacted to protect. Tragically,
the Sixth Circuit’s decision will have the greatest
56

See generally Steven Marchese, PUTTING SQUARE
PEGS INTO ROUND HOLES: MEDIATION AND THE RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE IDEA, 53
Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 361 (2001) (positing that because many parents already face great difficulties advocating on behalf of their
children at the IEP and due process hearing levels, they may settle cases to avoid more formal administrative or judicial proceedings).
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negative impact on those students with the clearest entitlement to IDEA services and the strongest ADA
claims—and who, like Miguel, have suffered from intentional, egregious misconduct.
The Sixth Circuit determined that, even in the
face of a settlement agreement that preserved his ADA
claims, by settling his IDEA claims, Miguel “traded
off ” his right to bring his ADA claim. Pet.App. 9a. But
Section 1415(l) does not demand that type of tradeoff.
It expressly allows Miguel to bring his ADA claim for
damages because that type of relief is not available under the IDEA. The Court should correct the Sixth Circuit’s dramatic departure from the statute’s command.
“[R]equiring administrative exhaustion for any case
that falls within the general ‘field’ of educating disabled students,” see generally Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 752 n.3
(citation omitted); Mark C. Weber, A New Look at
Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases,
16 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 25 (2010), returns us to the
days before Section 1415(l)’s enactment.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, amici curiae respectfully urge
this Court to reverse the decision of the Sixth Circuit.
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